I have long been interested on epistemological issues regarding complex adaptive systems and the role of simulation models in science and philosophy. There is a whole epistemic ecology of models in science and I am particularly interested on “conceptual simulation models” (typical of Artificial Life) where there is rarelly an empirical correlation between the model and any particular natural phenomenon. These models are not models of natural systems directly but rather models of principles and concepts that constitute biological and cognitive theories. As such, their epistemic status is somewhere in between theory and philosophy producing epistemic tools to understand complex systems.
- Moreno, A., Ruiz-Mirazo, K. and Barandiaran, X. (2010) The impact of the paradigm of complexity on the foundational frameworks of biology and cognitive science. Gabbay, D.M., Hooker, C., Thagard, P., Collier, J. and Woods, J. (Eds.) Philosophy of Complex Systems. Elsevier Handbook of The Philsophy of Science series.
- Barandiaran, X. E. & Chemero, A. (2009). Animats in the Modeling Ecosystem. Adaptive Behavior 17: 287—292.
- Barandiaran, X. & Moreno, A. (2006) ALife Models as Epistemic Artefacts. Proceeding of the 10th International Conference on Artificial Life. MIT Press, Cambridge: MA, pp. 513–519..
- Barandiaran, X. & Feltrero, R. (2003). Conceptual and methodological blending in cognitive science. The role of simulated and robotic models in scientific explanation. In Volume of abstracts of the 12th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Oviedo (Spain), August 7–13, 2003. p. 171.
- Barandiaran, X. (2004) La robótica evolutiva como epistemología experimental naturalizada. IV Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España. Aceptado.